Category Archives: Pseudorigorous Social Science
I think this is a decent way to operate in a hierarchy–particularly when it comes to big decisions like hiring/firing/approving new policies. We first assume the hierarchy is a tree (i.e. each member has only one immediate supervisor) and that there is a maximal element, called an “administrator”. The setup is that if something happens at level in the hierarchy (say hiring/firing someone at level (presuming the action is consistent with other policy)), then the relevant supervisor makes the nomination/recommendation for the action, and his/her supervisor confirms the action.
Hence let be a tree, and denote the supervisor of Typically in trees, minimal elements are considered level Here we reverse the ordering and call the maximal element the administrator, denoted by and say We define a rank policy as a policy that affects all successors (subordinates) of an element such that Hence we have:
The n+2 Operational Policy. Let be a rank policy and denote the member whose subordinates are affected. The policy then becomes activated provided proposes it and approves it.
Hence the Operational Policy itself is a rank policy as it affects everything in the hierarchy. But we arrive at a problem in continuing to execute this policy at levels and So we adjoin another set to the hierarchy called the board, denoted and redefine our hierarchy as where denotes the initial tree with unique maximal element We then define and
The main positive of this method is the minimizing of micromanagement. The only big negative that stands out is the possibility of actions diverging from intentions of a level member as one goes down the ladder. But I’d argue that this just means more level policy needs to be implemented in order to prevent that.
Definition 1. We define a static capital system as a triple with counting measure where and is called the monetary constant, is a collection of subsets of such that elements of which are called owners, and is called the worth of for an owner
Note we are not requiring to be closed under any operations (i.e. it is not an algebra of sets). Suppose we have two structures on and Let (i.e. a multi-valued map into ). Such a function is called a trade (and may correspondingly be thought of as a change of ownership). We define the trade utility of a trade as a map by
Again, need not be in but we can of course still define the counting measure on it.
Definition 2. A composite trade is a map where and are trades.
Note that since it is defined on the image of simply evaluates on all sets in
Definition 3. Let be a continuum of static capital systems. We say is a capital system if
- for every and there is a unique trade
- (i.e. );
- if and are trades such that then for all
Example 4. A capital system is in a socialist state at time if for all We may further say is socialist during if is in a socialist state for all A capital system is in a communist state at time if Similarly we have the definition for communist during a set
Note that by this definition a communist state implies a socialist state. In the above regards, a communist state can be thought of as having a single owner (say, “the people”), and socialist state has owners with equal worth.
Definition 5. A dynamic capital system is a capital system where is a static capital system for all where and are comparable (in the inclusion sense) for all In particular the function defined by is called the monetary policy. If is strictly increasing during an interval, we say is expansionary during that interval. Similarly it is contractionary if it is strictly decreasing on some interval.
Definition 6. A dynamic capital system is rational if for all
Of course if is we have and thus the condition is satisfied for this case:
So in a rational dynamic capital system we have the inequality
with If exists and is finite, then the rational dynamic capital system is said to have an end game.
There is a common misconception about the application of the theory of utilitarianism. Many attempt to apply it to events that have happened in history. The purpose of utilitarianism is, really, an attempt to establish a choice function on a set of options. Since events in history presumably happened precisely because of their sets of antecedents, there are no other choices of events; so utilitarian analysis of them is trivial. It can be usefully applied to psychology in the form of decision making. One must decide which behaviors to commit in a given set of circumstances based upon predicted costs and benefits. To approach this rigorously, we will work in ZF theory with special functions.
Definition 1. Let be a set and be a function called a utility function. The pair will be called a utilitarian set. A sub utilitarian set is a pair where and .
We will also define the trivial utilitarian set as the pair where .
Note that the motivation for closing the codomain on the left is that a behavior bringing death is assumed to be of minimal utility. This allows us to put a choice function on iff (i.e. iff the map is injective). This choice function is defined by
The only problem is that the choice function will pick the “worst” option, and we want to pick the “best”. Let us define
If is finite and is injective, then for all for some . In this case is a singleton consisting of the “best” element. If is not injective, then we may have . This isn’t a problem for the worst elements; if worst elements all go to the same value, we can just take them all out. But there is also the possibility of having best elements with the same utility.
Define a relation where . This is clearly an equivalence relation. Now consider the set . We have an induced utility function on defined by . By definition of the equivalence relation, we have that any induced utility function on is injective. Hence for any finite , we have a best element of . This is just the set of best elements of .
Definition 2. If is a utilitarian set, we call the class utilitarian set of .
One can easily see an isomorphism (in the sense that ) between and where and so on. We thus limit ourselves to utilitarian sets where is injective as it always will be on the class set.
Now assume the Axiom of Choice (for purposes of ordering elements of , and note this still doesn’t allow us to pick a “best” element of it trivially, since best is defined by the element taking largest value, if it exists). Let be a utilitarian set with denumerable. Then injectivity of allows for a set to be a bounded strictly monotonically increasing sequence in which in turn contains a convergent subsequence . Note we cannot say the sequence is bounded in the codomain, but it is of course bounded in .
Definition 3. Let be a denumerable utilitarian set with injective and an ordering of . We say is a decidable set if
where the max is taken over all convergent subseqences of . If is decidable, then the supremum above can be replaced with a maximum (otherwise its value would have been a limit over which the max on the left was taken, and hence, the maximum of them). Hence if is decidable, we define the best choice as
A utilitarian set is undecidable if it is not decidable.
Consider the function defined by
This is a semimetric on an arbitrary and a metric when is injective. We can make a modification and define the opportunity cost of with respect to by
If one assumes that behaviors consume resources proportional to the utility acquired, then the above describes a proportional number of resources lost (or gained if negative) by choosing behavior over .
Definition 4. A discrete path in is a sequence in , say . A path is a continuous map where is endowed with its topology induced by . We can define the marginal utility of a path at time and respectively for the type of path by
Note the second one may not exist. If one interprets this by defining a sequence for a behavior called “consuming a good” and where represents the number of units of that good consumed, then marginal utility simply represents the change of utility in consuming one additional unit of that good.
If we can accept that all decision making of individuals (i.e. psychology, where biological and environmental factors determine the utility function) models this theory, then aggregately so does that of groups of individuals–making this the foundation of social science.
Definition 1. A static legal system is a collection of individuals together with a collection of laws. (Mathematically, it’s a set , whose elements are called persons, together with a unary operation , called the null person, and a collection of infinitary -valued maps , called laws, such that all but finitely many of the terms in the domain are ).
For example, a law defined on persons may evaluate , meaning that law pertaining to individuals is legal (or illegal if it returned value ). To accommodate the influence that individual complexity has in a legal system, we could make the additional assumption that each person is a static legal system with persons and laws respectively replaced by perceptions and thoughts. Let denote the set of perceptions, the thoughts have the form such that all by finitely many of the perceptions are null perceptions. The value the thought takes determines whether or not a behavior is executed. But what is a behavior? A behavior executed from a thought is a model that satisfies the perceptions on which that thought was defined. Hence we could write
where are perceptions. In simple terms, this just means that you only act in agreement with your perceptions (simple thoughts that are assumed true). To reconnect back to the original static legal system, we may now say that laws dictate the legality of individual or group behavior. A person is simply a collection of perceptions together with thought functions. Hence we may say that a law defined on a thought function is in turn defined on all behaviors . We simply set .
Let us now assume every person behaves in a utilitarian manner. By this I mean that every person has a function where is the set of legal behaviors of an individual that satisfies the following conditions for all thoughts and perceptions such that (we also omit null perceptions for convenience):
Hence, assuming legality of the behavior, the above implications are equivalences (i.e. a legal behavior is committed if and only if it has positive utility). We could extend the utility functions to illegal behaviors, and the legal utility would be defined as
where is the cobehavior (or punishment) of . For legal behaviors , we have and hence . But we will assume all committed behaviors are legal for simplicity.
Sometimes groups of individuals will work together as a firm (or corporation) and execute aggregate legal behaviors of positive aggregate utility. The aggregate behavior and utility are defined as some function of the behavior and utility functions of members of the firm.
Example 2. Suppose is a corporate behavior which is a formal sum of behaviors of its members. Define the aggregate utility of a firm as
where is the utility function of the person committing behavior . Perhaps if a member contributes behaviors per day, then they may say the utility of a behavior is where is the salary of person . In this case the corporate utility summed over behaviors throughout the year would be their (in economic terms) normal profit (assuming no other expenditures), but it isn’t a very useful value since it does not indicate economic profits, which is really their utility in capitalistic economies.
Definition 3. A dynamic legal system is collection of static legal systems. A dynamic legal system is continuous if for every static legal system there is some such that the cardinalities of sets of laws for all static legal systems differ by at most (i.e. laws don’t change too fast).
A token economy is a special kind of dynamic legal system, indexed by time, where we define the utility of a behavior to be if it gives the person token. What makes a token economy special is conservation of utility. This means that
where is the th behavior committed by person for all static legal systems (i.e. the sum of token changes at any time is equal to ).
In particular it implies that any behavior of person (or firm) with utility has a coperson (or cofirm) such that is a cobehavior to person and .
Note: It’s definitely choppy in some areas and could use revision, but I thought I’d throw it out first.
Let me briefly summarize the post. A legal system is a collection of people, where each person is, for all intensive purposes, a collection of behaviors, together with a collection of laws that govern those behaviors. We can further assume that behaviors are committed provided that they are of positive utility. The behaviors that take negative values are cobehaviors (behaviors executed by other persons for whom the utility is positive and equal in magnitude). In actuality when one purchases something, although they lose money, they typically receive something else useful in return; however, our study is limited strictly to currency, in which case they lose from a purchase. In this case we can think of the economy of currency/tokens as an approximation to a fluid that changes its density through transactions; whereas the individual who loses/destroys tokens in exchange for a product can simply think of the product as a manifestation of the tokens exchanged for it.
We can graph political policy on a plane based on how the policy favors individuals and how it favors corporations (sets of individuals) and then label the results. We obtain something like this:
It’s important to note that the Democratic and Republican parties should not be confused with a democracy and a republic. A republic is a type of government in which all citizens have influence in their government. A democracy is a type of republic in which that influence is equal for all citizens. The US is a representative democracy in terms of the legislative arm, in which the equal influence is transitive: citizens have equal influence in who represents them, and the representatives in turn have equal influence is decision making. The US is more or less a meritocracy in the judicial and executive arms.